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In an era of widespread democracy in Latin America, attention to civil-military 
relations and defense policy has become a low priority for both politicians and scholars of 
the region. Interest has faded with the retreat of militarism and the military in 
government. Unlike the public debate that national economic, education, or health care 
policies provoke in most Latin American countries, civil and political society are 
relatively silent on the issues of national defense. Why do civilian politicians show little 
interest in investing resources and expertise in defense institutions? Why has there been a 
parallel drop in scholarly attention as democracies consolidate in the region?  
 A survey of Latin America’s past confirms that national defense policy has not 
been a high priority, even though the region has had a long history of troubled civil-
military relations. Military coups have been a greater threat to democratic regimes in 
Latin America than foreign invasion, but coup prevention is not usually a sound basis for 
defense policy. It is also true that the expectation for interstate war among the countries 
of the region has reached an all time low even by the standards of a relatively conflict 
free continent. Given the unlikelihood of war, it seems odd that there has been little 
defense rationalization to free up resources or meet new roles and missions, even in 
countries with well established civilian control of the armed forces such as Argentina. 
While a number of countries have initiated defense white book projects, these have (with 
the exception of Chile) undergone a single iteration, and the glossy volumes produced by 
these projects have more value as coffee table books than defense planning guidance.  
Latin American countries are dealing with emerging threats such as terrorism, 
organized crime, transnational gangs and drug trafficking that are in many cases 
overwhelming the capacity of the police to respond. The 2002 Pew Global Attitudes poll 
reports that Latin Americans consider terrorism and public safety ‘a very big problem’ in 
their countries, in significantly higher percentages than U.S. respondents even after the 
9/11 attacks.1 Given the negative experiences most of Latin America has with the use of 
the military in internal security roles, the reluctance of political leaders to involve the 
military is understandable, yet some threats are becoming so serious and so transnational 
that a role for the armed forces in supporting the police is inevitable. So why the lack of 
serious civilian attention to planning for such threats as part of a national security 
strategy? 
We argue that there are historical, structural and rational reasons for why defense 
issues in Latin America are a low priority Latin American politicians and scholars of the 
region. The post-independence development paths of Latin American states 
deemphasized the role of the military in interstate conflict, and the results were small 
armies with low offensive capabilities. Very few countries experienced the existential 
threats from their neighbors that would have prompted civilian state leaders to pay 
attention to defense policy. Instead, the major threat to the power of civilian leaders was 
domestic insurrection and the coup d’etat. Geography also blessed Latin America with a 
peripheral role in the major international conflicts of the past two centuries, which meant 
that conventional extra-continental threats were almost non-existent, again downgrading 
the importance of national defense to civilian political leaders. Even the United States in 
its role as a regional hegemon showed little interest in altering state boundaries or 
conquering new territories after the end of the 19th century. In fact, by the 1980s, it was 
rapidly becoming apparent that a zone of peace had emerged in South America that 
created an expectation that states would not use force to resolve their disputes. Instead, 
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international law and diplomacy have become the standard conflict-resolution 
mechanisms. Latin America spends the least on defense of any region of the world, 
purchases the fewest major weapons systems2, and in many countries, the military burden 
(as a percentage of GDP) shrank in the wake of democratic transitions.3 
Under these circumstances, the rational choice of politicians is to pay little 
attention to the national defense policy. There are almost no external threats, nor are they 
major economic or social constituencies in Latin American democracies that favor 
national defense issues.  Defense contracting is not a big business as it is in the United 
States, and thus is not a major employer.  Legislators and other politicians see no gain to 
be had in becoming defense savvy since they cannot deliver defense jobs to their districts 
in exchange for votes. Most scholars do not perceive Latin American militaries as worthy 
of serious study since they are peripheral to nearly all international conflicts in the last 
100 years. Politicians and scholars then only consider the military important as a potential 
threat to regime stability. However, the importance of that problem has receded with 
democratic consolidation, and it can in any event be contained through coup avoidance 
mechanisms rather than by paying serious attention to defense policy-making and 
institution building. 
 
HISTORICAL AND STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS FOR CIVILIAN 
INATTENTION TO NATIONAL DEFENSE 
 
Latin America’s civil-military relations have been profoundly affected by the 
continent’s peripheral position in the international system. The paucity of existential 
threats to the Latin American state provided a development path that deemphasized the 
role of military power in state survival. Extracontinental powers never directly threatened 
state survival in the region. The regional hegemon, the United States, had little interest in 
acquiring additional territory in the region after the mid-19th century, and its relative 
power was rapidly becoming so overwhelming that no combination of self-help or 
alliances could form a realistic Latin American counterweight that would allow a balance 
of power. By the twentieth century, war among most Latin American states had been 
confined to border clashes, which might be instrumental for advancing foreign policy 
objectives and even have domestic implications, but did not lead to sustained civilian 
interest in national defense. In fact, international relations in South America have instead 
become characterized by legalism and diplomacy, leading some to theorize the region as 
a zone of peace. The absence of existential external security threats has meant that 
civilians and the armed forces focused on internal development and domestic politics. 
The result was that civilian politicians might have been occasionally interested in 
managing civil-military relations as a means to regime defense,  but they were hardly 
ever interested in national defense policy or developing strategies for national security. 
 
Path Dependency and the Historical Evolution of Latin America’s Civil-Military 
Relations 
 
 Latin America’s early post-independence history features considerable armed 
conflict, but the result was not the consolidation of professional military establishments 
or civilian interest in national defense. State boundaries were settled relatively early, 
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particularly once the ambitions of independence leaders to build large regional states, 
such as the Gran Colombia or the United Provinces of Central America, were dashed by 
separatist movements. There were a large number of militarized disputes, but these were 
fought by regional caudillos struggling to achieve national supremacy and in-fill the 
hollow administrative and legal shells left by Spanish colonial rule. Threats were internal 
and domestic and threatened the personal power of the caudillo, but they were rarely 
struggles for national survival. The state-building and army-building cycles hypothesized 
by Charles Tilly to explain European state formation never took hold in Latin America, 
or did so only incompletely.4 
Nineteenth century South American did experience a small number of major 
interstate wars, but the outcomes of the wars did not produce a security dilemma or the 
militarization of regional states. The War of the Pacific (1879-1883), in which Chile was 
victorious over Peru and Bolivia, and the War of the Triple Alliance, in which Argentina 
and Brazil defeated Paraguay (1864-1870), instead produced more or less stable regional 
settlements that were not subsequently challenged by force of arms. In particular, Chile 
and Brazil emerged as territorially satisfied powers, and the most significant threat to 
regional stability, Paraguay, was nearly destroyed in the war of the Triple Alliance and 
never recovered. The combination of Chile and Brazil’s power was sufficient to deter any 
serious challenges to altering the outcome of these conflicts. It is worth noting that even 
though Paraguay was thoroughly defeated, it survived as an independent state. As 
Dominguez observes, there are only six instances in which the territorial boundaries of 
states in Central and South America were significantly altered by force.5  
European powers never succeeded in occupying the territory of Latin American 
states for very long, nor did they exhibit much interest in doing so, and Latin American 
states did not militarize to protect themselves from extra-continental threats as a result. 
The United Kingdom intervened relatively early in the post-independence period to 
secure the independence of Uruguay (1825) as a buffer state between Brazil and 
Argentina in the River Platte region. The French intervention in Mexico to set up the 
reign of Emperor Maximilian was encouraged by Mexico’s conservatives who feared a 
liberal political victory under Benito Juarez, but it only lasted three years until 1867. In 
part, Latin American independence benefited from the relative quiescence of European 
imperialism between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the 1870s. During this period, 
the predominance of Great Britain in world affairs, which at the time preferred trade to 
conquest, tended to shield the region from intervention by other European powers. This 
does not mean that Latin American states were particularly sovereign, but the type of 
European intervention did not trigger a civilian interest in national defense, and with the 
exception of Mexico, a national mobilization to defend against such incursions.  
Even the United States, which militarily intervened on numerous occasions in 
Latin America, did not pose an existential threat to the Latin American state, but rather to 
the power of its rulers. It is true that the Mexican-American war of 1848 let to major 
annexations of territory from Mexico. However, as Schoultz shows, there was 
considerable resistance in the United States to absorbing any territory that was culturally 
and demographically Hispanic. The territory annexed from the north of Mexico was seen 
by the U.S. elites as largely empty of people (and hence acceptable). Prior to the U.S. 
Civil War, private filibustering expeditions pursuing new acquisitions in Central America 
and Cuba were discouraged by the federal government, reflecting a consensus among 
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important segments of North and South that absorbing new territories that were culturally 
Hispanic would place an unacceptable burden on U.S. institutions. Similar sentiments led 
to the rejection of Dominican requests for annexation to the U.S. in 1869, and the non-
annexation of Cuba and Puerto Rico after the Spanish American war. Even the 
intervention in Panama resulted in the lease of a 10 mile wide strip of territory and the 
creation of a new country, not the physical extinction of the Colombian state. This does 
not mean that the United States thought highly of Latin American capacity for self-
governance, and it used political instability as an excuse to intervene repeatedly to 
replace regimes it disliked.6 However, much as was the case with 19th century European 
interventions, the result was not the development of Latin American military capabilities 
or alliances in an attempt to counterbalance the United States. 
So what did Latin American militaries do if they did not participate in 
international wars? Latin American militaries of the nineteenth century were generally 
small, pre-professional and focused on internal disputes. In fact, it is difficult to 
characterize them as armies at all, since they were more likely to behave as armed 
political parties. The boundaries between the military and civilian politics were fluid, 
accession rules for the officer corps were almost non-existent, and professional education 
was largely absent. However, this did allow leading political figures to move back and 
forth between the civilian and military world, as Argentine presidents Sarmiento and 
Roca did during the war of the Triple Alliance and the Campaign of the Desert during the 
1860s and 1870s. We can speculate that this might have provided the foundation for an 
elite tradition of interest and service in the armed forces. However, the subsequent 
professionalization of Latin America’s militaries, largely conducted by foreign military 
missions, French and German in the main, broke this link. Officers were now a 
specialized body of educated professionals drawn from the aspiring lower and declining 
upper middle classes. The French and German military traditions shared a tradition of 
suspicion towards civilian authority and imbued militaries with a sense of national 
protagonism. Thus, the civilian and military worlds grew increasingly distant from one 
another as civilian politicians increasingly left defense affairs to the (military) 
specialists.7 
By the early twentieth century, history, geography and the international system 
had placed Latin American states in a position where they did not face the existential 
threats that could have led to the forging of the type of civilian-military national defense 
complexes exhibited by even the smaller European powers of the times. Latin American 
armies were neither created nor called upon to serve in ways commensurate with West 
European armies. With few exceptions, Latin American rarely used offensive power to 
enlarge national territories at the expense of their neighbors.  They were mainly involved 
in internal, internecine conflicts between caudillos, political party bosses and other power 
brokers--all within boundaries set by Spain and Portugal. Consequently, they did not have 
to grow to a size or achieve a readiness consonant with the tasks of state formation, and 
hence they do not inherit the critical legacies of the European armies.  Strip away the 
myths armies have built about their indispensable roles in  defense of  “la Patria” and you  
are left with the fact that these institutions, with one or two exceptions, never succeeded  
at expanding the reach of states, or even consolidating the territories they had.8  
Since their neighbors’ armies posed such little threat to them compared to their 
own, it is no wonder that Latin America’s civilian politicians abandoned an interest in 
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national defense and instead focused on regime defense.  Civilian inattention to defense 
policy is a path-dependent phenomenon. Civilians do not believe their neighbors are a 
threat because history has shown that their neighbors rarely attack, so they pay little 
attention to defense policy and avoid funding strong militaries. The result is a relatively 
weak military establishment that poses little threat to their neighbors, reinforcing the 
civilian belief system. It would be very hard to reverse this path and start over to achieve 
militaries with strong offensive capabilities because the whole state infrastructure to 
support such an establishment (conscription, taxation, arms industries, logistics, 
mobilization plans) was underdeveloped due to the relatively benign threat environment. 
Even if Latin American civilian politicians had wanted a strong military by the 20th 
century, their states were, barring one or two exceptions, in no condition to support such 
an expensive adventure.   
 
Structural Explanations for Civilian ADD 
 
Latin America’s peripheral position in the international system means that the 
states in the region are rarely subject to the security dilemmas, existential threats, or arms 
races more typical of other regions of the world. In the absence of actual or potential 
military threats, realists and neorealist theorists of international relations would concede 
that civilian inattention to defense policy is understandable. The fact that South America 
escaped essentially untouched by the fighting in both major world conflicts (1914-1918 
and 1939-1945) of the period confirms just how peripheral the region is within the 
structure of the international system. This has also translated into a paucity of 
conventional external threats for Latin American states emanating from outside the 
continent. The geography of the continent and the limited offensive capabilities of the 
states in the region meant that most politicians did not conceive of their neighbors as 
threats, and balance of power behavior was limited, even among the more powerful states 
in the Southern Cone. U.S. hegemony also discouraged the pursuit of offensive military 
capabilities among states in the region. In addition to realist arguments, liberal and 
constructivist theorists of international relations would also point to democratization in 
the 1980s as reinforcing a trend towards regional peace. In fact, some liberal theorists 
have suggested that South America has become a de facto zone of peace and may be the 
locus of an emerging pluralistic security community. In essence, both liberal and realist 
theorists of international relations would probably agree that it would be logically 
difficult to mobilize public or political interest in national defense or justify large military 
establishments.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the gross characteristics of national 
boundaries were well established. The only major wars that occurred during the 20th 
century that resulted in territorial boundary changes were the Chaco War between Bolivia 
and Paraguay and the Peru-Ecuador conflict in 1941 which led to Ecuador’s loss of its 
Amazonian territories. It is worth noting that both the Chaco and the Ecuadorian Amazon 
are peripheral, thinly populated and poor territories for the countries involved, so their 
loss had minimal effects on the material wealth of the elites or the voters, although they 
loom large in national histories. Even the Central American conflicts of the 1980s, which 
did lead to substantial militarization of society and drew the attention of civilian elites to 
defense affairs, were focused on the threat of internal subversion rather than cross-border 
Pion-Berlin/Trinkunas                            Attention Deficits 
 7
attack. For both El Salvador and Nicaraguan ruling elites, the FMLN and the Contras 
were a much greater threat to the state than each others armed forces.9 
The United States policy has indirectly reinforced the trend away from interstate 
conflict by encouraging a focus on internal defense for Latin American militaries, rather 
than by directly intervening to resolve the conflicts that did occur. Contemporary 
international relations theory has occasionally referred to the U.S. role in Latin America 
as a classic example of hegemonic management, with the United States intervening to 
prevent war in the region.  But we concur with Mares (2001) and Dominguez (2005) that 
U.S. hegemony has had little influence on interstate conflict per se. In fact, some would 
point to the Central American conflicts of the 1980s as an example of hegemonic 
‘mismanagement’ that provoked greater conflict. Instead, we argue that the United States 
has influenced the nature of the militaries in the region in a way that deemphasizes 
conventional offensive capabilities. As early as World War II, the explicit policy of the 
United States was to assume the mantle of defending the Americas against 
extracontinental conventional military threats, and supporting and training Latin 
American armed forces to counter domestic subversion. The United States contributed to 
this trend as a major purveyor of military assistance and training to the region, through 
which it emphasized an internal orientation, provided counterinsurgency equipment and 
training and discouraged the purchase of advanced war fighting platforms by Latin 
American states. Latin American states began to diversify their acquisitions to European 
and Asian suppliers by the 1970s, but this still means that U.S. influence favoring a 
domestic orientation influenced two generations of military officers and discouraged the 
development of offensive military capabilities.10 
The internal orientation of Latin American defense establishments was reflected 
in decisions about defense budgets, military training, and acquisitions. It meant that many 
Latin American militaries never developed the capabilities to engage in sustained 
offensive operations. The shortcomings of a relatively well-equipped Latin American 
military, such as Argentina’s, in the face of combat against a capable European adversary 
is highlighted by the outcome of the Malvinas conflict.11 This reinforced negative civilian 
perceptions about the usefulness of their military establishments, reduced the likelihood 
of armed conflict between neighboring states, and contributed to the lack of civilian 
political interest in defense policy. It also meant that Latin American militaries were 
often more dangerous to the regime in power in their own country than that of their 
neighbors, which produced civilian fear and suspicion of the military, and was most 
likely not conducive to developing civilian political interest in defense policy.12     
Although disputed by scholars such as Mares (2001), democratization across the 
region during the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to a reduction in the resort to the use 
of force among Latin American states. In essence, the relative absence of war in Latin 
America would seem to support the often debated ‘democratic peace’ hypothesis set forth 
by liberal theorists of international relations. In the Southern Cone, democratizers in 
Argentina sought to demilitarize and eliminate conflicts with their neighbors to 
undermine the rationale for the existence of a large (and politically active) military. They 
had greater success initially convincing Brazil than Chile, but by the end of the 1990s, 
Argentina had successfully resolved all of its major border disputes. They also sought 
greater regional integration through the MERCOSUR treaty framework, and Pion-Berlin 
has documented how economic integration in the Southern Cone has reinforced an 
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expectation of peaceful interstate dispute resolution.13 The Contadora process in Central 
America, crafted by and pressed forward by civilian politicians in Mexico, Colombia, 
Venezuela, and the Southern Cone during the 1980s, also hinged on an expectation that 
democratization would produce a more peaceful subregion. Whether or not this logic was 
correct, it certainly appeared to be so for the civilian leaders of these major regional 
powers.14 
 This sustained peace has not meant that there has been no attention paid to 
regional security, but rather it has promoted diplomatic and legal (i.e. civilian) 
institutional innovations. Dominguez documents contributions to international law that 
originate in inter-American diplomacy, the most important of which is uti possidetis juri, 
which established that a modern states boundaries should match those of their colonial 
predecessor and favors the territorial integrity of states. He also points to the role of the 
OAS in managing interstate disputes and organizing peacekeeping mechanisms.15 Arie 
Kacowicz goes further and argues that South America has developed a ‘zone of peace’ in 
which states no longer expect to go to war with each other. Certainly, the Southern Cone 
has come the furthest towards developing a pluralistic security community whose 
members no longer have an expectation that force will be used in their interstate 
relations. The concept of zone of peace has even been enshrined in certain limited forms 
by regional treaties, such as the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing Latin America as a 
nuclear-weapons free zone.16 Mares has disagreed with the concept of ‘zones of peace’ as 
a description of the international relations of Latin America, pointing out that states still 
make the choice to militarize interstate disputes.17 However, even the conflicts he 
identifies are small in scale and have not sparked significant civilian interest in defense 
policy beyond a brief ‘rally around the flag’ effect during the period of the conflict itself.  
 
Civilian Defense Attention Deficits  as a Result of Path Dependency 
 
 History and structure have reinforced civilian tendencies to ignore national 
defense policy. The peripheral status of Latin America as a continent and the policies of 
the hegemonic powers that dominated 19th and 20th century international relations greatly 
reduced the likelihood of existential threats to state survival in Latin America. The 
relative absence of even interstate threats within Latin America and the stability of 
territorial boundaries have afforded national elites the luxury of ignoring defense policy. 
The professionalization of Latin American militaries in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century concentrated knowledge and expertise in an institution that is ipso facto not well 
connected to the civilian political and economic elites. The inward focus of civilian and 
military elites brought about a competition for national leadership and established (for 
both sides) that the main threats to retaining and exercising power lay in the domestic 
sphere (coups and revolutions) rather than the international. Both liberal and realist 
theories of international relations would predict that Latin America is an unlikely 
candidate for arms races, balance of power behavior or acute security dilemmas. Without 
such a stimulus for the development of offensive capabilities, it makes sense that civilian 
elites preferred diplomacy and international law as solutions to interstate disputes, 
reinforcing the prolonged peace in the region. The overall effect of history and structure 
is to produce a path by which civilian elites have consistently turned away from 
developing an interest in national defense as an important field of public policy.  





RATIONAL CHOICE AS A SOURCE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE ATTENTION 
DEFICITS 
 
 In addition to history and international relations, the contemporary Latin 
American politicians’ attention deficit on defense issues is a rational choice, driven by 
their constituents’ interests and priorities. Of course, no one familiar with the region 
would suggest that the political class of Latin America earn high marks for attentiveness 
to citizen demands; far from it.  Representation or lack thereof remains a serious problem. 
Nonetheless, if they are to survive, governments must demonstrate some ability to deliver 
essential goods (services) to the public and respond to its most pressing needs. Defense is 
an essential public good in most states, but is not perceived by the public in Latin 
America as a pressing national priority.  Unlike other public goods, Latin American states 
rarely ‘consume’ national defense.  Not a week goes by when the average Latin 
American citizen does not rely on the power, transportation, communication, sewage, 
health and school systems.  But defense lies in waiting; it is almost never used, and 
seldom visible.  If it is in a state of disrepair (as the roads, phones, electrical grids, and 
trains invariably are) citizens do not mind since it does not directly affect their daily lives.   
Consider the following thought experiment.  Let us say the Chilean military, 
unannounced suspend all their territorial defense functions for a week: no border, sea or 
air patrols, no training, all officers and enlisted personnel return to their homes. What 
would occur? In all likelihood, nothing would happen.  The public would carry on as 
usual.  None of Chile’s neighbors would seize on its vulnerability and launch an invasion 
because relations between these states are generally stable and friendly, and even if they 
were not, neighboring states lack serious offensive capabilities.  There are no 
insurrectionary forces that would suddenly emerge to threaten the state or society from 
within. Now compare this to the reaction if the electrical power and water supplies to be 
cut off to all major cities for a week.  We could imagine the response of an alarmed, 
frantic and angry public: it would quickly identify the culpable government officials, and 
hold them accountable for the disaster.   Defense in this part of the world at least,  is a 
very different kind of public good from electricity, water or roads.  Politicians can earn 
political capital by filling potholes or building new highways.  They cannot earn capital 
by funding yet another year of defense for a country that has no enemies and faces no 
imminent threats. 
  Defense could become a pressing priority were military-related threats to national 
security more common, visible and imminent, and where the need to deploy military 
force more apparent. There are to be sure, various threats to security (narcotrafficking, 
terrorism, contraband, other criminal activity, and illegal migration) but these do not by 
and large compel wholesale military responses. In this not so “new” security 
environment, police, internal security forces, immigration authorities, and intelligence 
services are at the front line.  Militaries occupy rearguard positions, waiting for the 
occasional call to assist the other forces.  Even when they do engage, they do so in a 
limited way, whether it be logistical support, aerial surveillance, or conducting anti-crime 
sweeps through a favela controlled by drug traffickers.  These are not the kind of 
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missions that fully test the capabilities of the military institution or provide a rationale for 
expanding defense spending.  For that reason, politicians cannot persuasively sell anti-
crime or counternarcotic efforts as defense-related missions.  
 Of course, even in the absence of threat, defense could still be relevant were it to 
provide important private goods to its citizens.  In the U.S., that good is employment. 
Millions of North Americans-- in many cases whole communities--depend on  defense 
expenditures for their livelihoods.  Military bases and munitions plants that employ 
civilians are found in almost every state.  They give legislators, governors and the 
president the motivation to care and know about national security, military procurement, 
the defense budget (and its enlargement), and they know that sustained attention to these 
issues will be rewarded by the votes of communities dependent on defense spending. Key 
legislators and their highly trained staff sit on the House Armed Services Committee and 
its Senate counterpart where they wield considerable clout. By contrast, in Latin 
America, military installations and defense contractors provide very few civilian jobs;  
defense is not a huge pork-barreling opportunity.18 Thus, few lawmakers stand to gain by 
diverting expenditures from other national priorities, such as health and education, or 
becoming more informed about defense. 
 To get a sense of the comparison between defense employment as a private good 
in the United States and Latin America, we provide some statistics in the tables below for 
a few countries from the region.  Data is extremely hard to come by on civilian 
employment in the defense sector in Latin America.  Fortunately, we have found some 
comparable figures for Argentina and the U.S. on governmental civilian employment in 
defense for 2005, as shown below.   This first set of data covers civilian jobs in the army, 
navy and air force, on military bases, installations, and in schools, hospitals and defense-
related government agencies. They exclude employment in private sector defense 
industries. The data are shown  in absolute terms and as a percent of the economically 
active population.  We should keep one caveat in mind:  the Argentine data represents 
figures for the beginning of fiscal year budget defense jobs.  Thus, there may have been  
some unaccounted for changes during the execution of the budget. Be that as it may,  and 
as can be shown in Tables 1 and 2,  U.S. employment in the public sphere  is twenty four 
times that in Argentina in absolute terms. Once adjusted for the employable population of 
each country, the U.S. governmental defense employment is equal to two and a half times 
that of Argentina.    
 
 
Tables 1 and 2 About Here 
 
 This is certainly a sizeable difference, but at the same time grossly understates the 
real magnitude of the difference between the two countries by omitting private sector 
employment in arms production.  Table 3 makes that comparison.  Since Argentina 
down-sized and privatized its sprawling defense conglomerate called Fabricaciones 
Militares during the 1980s and 90s, arms production  has been largely  in the hands of  
non-military owned enterprises.  Of course in the United States, arms production is big 
business for the private sector.  Munitions production generally occurs as a result of 
contracting between the Pentagon and private firms. Thus we can safely assume that the 
figures in Table 3 represent employment in the private, not public  sphere.   As shown, 
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the U.S. employs almost 58 times as many citizens in the defense industry as does 
Argentina.  If we then combine government and private sector data for the two countries, 
as we do in Table 4, we see that overall civilian defense employment in the U.S., as a 
proportion of the EAP, is 1,100 percent greater than in Argentina. Certainly such a 
comparison does not allow us to make any easy generalizations about the Latin American 
region as a whole. However, since Argentina has historically had one of the larger 
military industrial complexes, rivaled only by Brazil, then the differences with the U.S. 
will presumably be even greater elsewhere. 
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 About Here 
 
 
 In fact, there is also some arms production employment data on four other Latin 
American countries: Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, as shown in Table 5.   Brazil is of 
particular importance, since this nation has historically had  the largest  defense industry 
in Latin America.  Yet the tables reveal that once adjusted for the size differentials of the 
work forces, arms production employment in  Brazil, along with the other three countries 
is completely dwarfed by the United States.  One final metric is worth noting. Of the one 
hundred largest arms producing companies in the world--measured by annual sales-- 
forty four are headquartered in the United States. The rest are found mainly in France, 
Germany, UK,  other European countries, Russia, South Korea, Japan and  Israel. Not 
one of the top 100 firms is located in Latin America.19 
 
 
Table 5 About Here 
 
 There are simply not enough civilians involved in defense related activities in 
Latin America to constitute an electoral payoff for politicians: not on bases, not in 
ministries, not in the military academies, nor in munitions factories.  It is hard for 
political figures to prioritize defense in the face of relatively low security threats when 
they preside over defense budgets that do not translate into significant employment 
opportunities for the civilian population, and into a potential pool of grateful voters.   
And those few who have defense jobs constitute such a small fraction of the voting public 
that they are in no position to adequately reward political leaders for attention to defense 
issues.  For example, civilians in the public and private defense sector in Argentina 
constitute just one tenth of a percent of all registered voters.  That same constituency is 
thirty times greater in the U.S., equal to three percent of registered voters. If we turn back 
to Table 5 for a moment, and consider what fraction of registered voters are represented 
by those in the arms production industries for the four countries listed, then the figures 
are as follows: Brazil--one hundredth of a percent; Chile 6 hundredths of a percent; 
Mexico, nine thousandths of a percent; and Peru, two hundredths of a percent.   
 If politicians see no pork barreling or vote-attracting opportunities in defense, 
they could still theoretically be interested in defense spending for macroeconomic 
reasons. That is, they could associate greater defense spending with overall 
improvements in the national economy, and thus be stimulated to learn more about it as 
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matter of policy proficiency.  However, the prevailing view --one confirmed by numerous 
studies--is that military spending is a drag on economic growth.   In a statistical study of 
18 Latin American countries, Kirk Bowman finds that increases in both military spending 
and military size result in significant declines in economic growth, even when controlling 
for democracy, school enrollments, government consumption,  political instability, and 
investment. 20  The International Monetary Fund considers spending on the military to be 
unproductive, and has counseled LDC’s to redirect funds  away from defense and toward 
health and education in order to balance the budget while targeting spending along  
economically beneficial avenues.21   Conversely, the Fund has published a number of 
studies arguing that cuts in military spending will result in improved economic output, 
and in the long run, greater investment rates and overall economic welfare.22 
 The IMF reports have given greater momentum to a military downsizing trend 
that was already well underway in Latin America.  For economic and political reasons 
many Latin American states were, by the mid 1980’s, making significant cuts in the size 
of military forces and budgets.  It is important to note that defense expertise did not factor 
into politicians’ decisions to downsize their militaries.  Military programs, training and 
installations have been eliminated and personnel payrolls trimmed based on 
macroeconomic criteria, pressures from international lenders, and the political priorities 
of diverting resources to other areas.  Such cuts were not made with defense-related 
needs in mind.  Top policymakers demanded these cuts without asking what budget 
curtailments would mean for military strategy, force readiness, deployment, training, 
education, etc.  They did not appointed civilian defense specialists to oversee the 
implementation of these cuts, but rather directed the military to operate within an ever 
shrinking budget cap.   Rather than allocate resources based on a national security 
strategy, defense priorities were set (and scaled back) based on budgetary resources, 
which were in turn guided by overarching political priorities. Civilians set their own 
national priorities, assigned the military to the end of the queue, and then exerted the 
political will necessary to keep them there. This requires little defense expertise.   
 By the end of the twentieth century, the armed forces of most countries of the 
region had shrunk dramatically in size.  This fact figures into the electoral calculations in 
certain Latin American countries that have granted active duty soldiers  the right to vote.  
Politicians wishing to curry favor with voting soldiers would have, in theory, an interest 
in becoming more defense savvy. Unfortunately however, defense wisdom could 
produce, at best, a negligible electoral return because of the diminished size of nearly all 
Latin American militaries in comparison to the population of registered voters.  As shown 
below in Table 6, there are ten countries in the region with voting soldiers.  On average, 
these active duty soldiers constitute less than seven tenths of one percent of all registered 
voters.23   Naturally for the other half of Latin America that prohibits balloting for 
military personnel, the electoral advantage disappears entirely. 
 
 
Table 6 about Here 
 
 
The bottom line is that civilian defense workers and soldiers  comprise an 
insignificant fraction of  the overall work force and voting public in Latin America.  
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Politicians have no incentive to “get up to speed” on defense issues or deliberate on 
defense policy, either in pursuit of narrow self interests or  broader national  policy goals.  
Political parties in Latin America rarely include defense issues in their platform 
statements, and do not make defense an issue either in the campaigns or thereafter.24  
Not surprisingly, the defense attention deficit is quite pronounced within the 
legislative branches in Latin America.25  Legislative defense commissions--where they 
exist--are poorly equipped to wield authority and oversight. Congressional members of 
these commissions seldom stay long.  They shuffle in and out and thus do not gain the 
necessary experience and expertise. Their inattentiveness is both a cause and a 
consequence of committee weakness. Certainly if legislators were to serve for longer 
periods of time, they would accumulate more defense knowledge which in turn might  
strengthen the committee’s work. But the defense commissions have a restricted mandate 
which proves unattractive  for legislators looking for institutionalized power . Based on 
data provided by Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL 2004), a 
review of defense committee work  for 13 countries in recent  years shows that they most 
often deal with the following issues: granting permission for  deployment of national 
troops abroad, and for the entrance of foreign troops into national territory, promotion 
and retirement rules, pensions and social security  benefits for officers and families; 
judicial matters, including military court jurisdictions, and finally  decorative/symbolic 
acts, including the conferring of  medals and honors.  These functions correspond very 
closely to what the national constitutions stipulate for the legislative branch in general.  
In other words, defense commissions have not carved out their own more detailed and 
unique defense agendas. 
 It is instructive to reflect on what these commissions are not doing on a regular 
basis.  They are not reviewing the defense portion of the budgets, and for good reason; 
they have no access to them. Congressmen are not privy to the itemized details of the 
defense ledger.  In most Latin American societies, national security trumps the right of 
Congress to review, analyze, let alone change defense allocations. Neither the defense 
commissions nor the budget and finance commissions are empowered to reopen, examine 
and rewrite the defense budget.  There is no item by item review, no markup and thus no 
real capacity to assign or reassign resources. In essence, legislative committees have very 
little power compared to other committees within their very same legislatures, and 
certainly much less than that found in developed countries.  
 This then impairs the committees’ ability to carry out another vital function: 
oversight. Defense commissions are not exerting informed oversight on defense 
operations, other than, as stated before, to decide  on domestic and foreign troop exits and 
entrances, and occasionally weigh in on defense production and procurement as well as 
military judicial matters. Without the necessary expenditure information, the congress 
cannot take the military to task for misallocations, wasteful spending or fraud.  The 
commissions have no auditors at their disposal to pore over military accounts.  The 
commissions can at best, call the defense minister to testify.  If there is any effort--
however limited--to exert budgetary oversight, it appears to be exercised within the 
finance ministry, or more usually, the armed services themselves. 
If the internal politics of Latin American states fail to provide a rationale for 
politicians to understand defense issues, then what of regional  influences?   Here too we 
find little in the way of rational incentives. There is no parallel to NATO in Latin 
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America.26   The democratic governments of the new NATO members from Eastern and 
Central Europe had three strong incentives to overhaul their defense systems to bring 
them up to speed and make them interoperable with the more advanced NATO members.  
First, NATO entrance translated into automatic security guarantees. Second, the voting 
publics of these states were, for the most part, strongly supportive of NATO accession. 
And third, the NATO organization gave them favorable terms when it came to cost-
sharing for common alliance expenses, in effect subsidizing their participation while 
allowing them to reap the rewards.    
The United States has never shown interest in creating a hemispheric alliance 
similar to NATO that would integrate, give parity to, and help finance, Latin American 
forces to meet conventional defense threats.  As mentioned earlier, the U.S. arrogated the 
mission of guarding the hemisphere from external threats during the Cold War while 
relegating its southern partners to more less tasking domestic security functions. In the 
post Cold War global war on terror, the U.S. once again sees itself as taking the lead, 
imploring the Latin American states to perform supporting roles. Even if Latin American 
states would tolerate being the lesser partners in such an arrangement, where are the 
material incentives to do so? Washington has focused most of its military assistance on 
Colombia, leaving very little for the rest of the continent. To the contrary, the U.S. has 
recently withheld military assistance (including IMET) from several Latin American 
states as punishment for failing to sign Article 98 agreements that would provide U.S. 
soldiers with immunity from potential human rights prosecutions by the International 
Criminal Court.  Where else would funding originate from?  It would not come from the 
Organization of American States, which has yet to agree on a formula to create its own 
regional security force that would bear some resemblance to NATO, even if it could find 
the resources to support such a project.   
The fact is, there are no internal or external, material or rational incentives to 
motivate civilians to institutionalize their oversight of defense or to spearhead the reform 
and modernization of defense forces. For that reason, when and if reform and 
modernization are ever realized, they will not come at the behest of civilian leadership. 
 
DEFENSE ATTENTION DEFICITS AMONG SCHOLARS 
 
 North American scholars pay scant attention to Latin American civil-military 
issues in general and defense policy in particular.  If it is rational for Latin American 
politicians to ignore defense because they have no incentives to pay attention to it does 
this logically imply that academics would be equally uninspired to study the topic?   
 First, let us assess the magnitude of the civil-military and defense attention deficit 
among the scholarly community.  Table 7 displays the results of a content analysis of 
article titles in the three leading Latin American area studies journals: Latin American 
Research Review, Latin American Politics and Society (formerly Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs), and Journal of Latin American Studies.  All 
research articles, commentaries and debates were included for all volumes and issues 
between 1976-2005.  We were charitable-perhaps too charitable-- in our definition of  
“military-related,” and thus probably overstate the contribution of  writings on the 
military to these journals.  Included here were any articles that mentioned (besides the 
military or armed forces, defense or security) war, interstate conflict, armed conflict, and 
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authoritarianism, despotism and dictatorship. We were careful to include only those 
articles that referenced military authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, even here, there were 
probably some articles about authoritarianism which had little to do with the military 
institution per se, let alone defense and security themes, and more to do with economic 
and social policies, technocrats, or culture. Secondly, articles on the drug war were 
ostensibly much more about U.S., Peruvian and Colombian government policies to stem 
the cultivation of coca, processing into cocaine, and its transshipment north, and less 
about the military components to that war. 
  Be that as it may, the results display a tremendous dearth of articles on the 
subject of the military and defense policy, and a general downward trend beginning in the 
middle to late 1980’s.  Whereas approximately 9 percent of all articles were on military 
themes from 1976-1985, only 5 percent of all articles have been devoted to this theme in 
the last decade. And if we were to have restricted the 30 year search to just those articles 
with defense in the title, there would be fewer than half a dozen in all, a small fraction of 
one percent. 
 Disinterest in the topic is widespread, though greater among North American than 
Latin American scholars.27  Why the disinterest in the topic?   In large measure, scholars 
have been greatly influenced by the U.S. role in the hemisphere which for many decades 
and especially during the Cold War, relegated  our Southern neighbors to a peripheral, 
dependent role in hemispheric defense (see above).  U.S. defense and security scholars 
have, in overwhelming proportions, focused their attention on major powers and few 
regional powers (Israel, South and North Korea)  in regions of the world where threats 
loom large, where military force has been used more frequently in the past, or where 
geopolitical and economic interests vital to Washington may be at stake. Latin America 
just does not have that level of significance for the security community in the United 
States. 
  Ironically, we might expect more attention to the theme now in the post-Cold 
War era, because the decline in U.S. interest in and military aid to the region has opened 
up space for Latin American states to define their own defense roles.  That is to say, 
states of this region are acting less as minor partners in hemispheric defense and more as 
autonomous actors free to carve out their own defense and security niches. This has 
already resulted in extensive efforts among the Southern Cone states to increase contacts, 
exchanges and confidence building measures between their militaries, and the creation of  
autonomous, regional security institutions in Central America, such as the civilian 
Central American Security Commission (CSC) and a military run Conference of Central 
American Armed Forces (CFAC).28  Unfortunately, this reality has not caught up with 
scholars, who rarely address the topic. 
  Even the issue of democratic civilian control, which plausibly would provoke 
greater enthusiasm among U.S. scholars, has elicited far fewer contributions than one 
would imagine.  As it has been commonly defined, civilian control exists when a 
coherent group of civilian politicians and experts are able to set the priorities and 
direction for national defense through well-developed institutional channels.29  In fact 
nearly all definitions, including Huntington’s, reference institutional strength, defense 
expertise, and defense agenda control by civilians.  However, if defense is not a priority 
in Latin America, then neither is there a need to understand how to achieve or articulate 
civilian control.  Scholars do not take seriously the notion that L.A. armies are important 
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providers of defense and security, and thus do not consider the achievement of civilian 
control to have quite the same “gravitas” it might have for advanced Western states. 
 In Latin America, civilian control understood mostly in negative terms--how to 
curtail military power, avoid coups and reduce military intervention.  Scholarly interest in 
civil-military relations, which was never pronounced to begin with, has waned even 
further over the last two decades as the coup threat recedes in the face of democratic 
consolidation. Coups and coup attempts do occur but they are few and far between.   
Since the return to democratic rule, there have been only six military coups or coup 
attempts in four countries: Haiti, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Ecuador. Only in Ecuador 
and Haiti did the coups succeed, and only in Haiti did the coup plotters actually remain in 
power.   As discussed before, regional changes have raised the costs to military 
intervention to unprecedented heights, and have generally dissuaded coup plotters from 
even trying.  In those few cases where coups were actually carried out, the de facto 
governments that came to power lasted less than 48 hours, succumbing to enormous 
internal and external pressures.30  This raises an important point: if coups are increasingly 
scarce, scholars conclude it is because civilian politicians have succeeded in avoiding 
their forcible expulsion from power—by what ever means necessary—and hence there is 
little need to probe further into the whys and wherefores of civil-military relations. 
Civilian control has not been conceived as a long term institution-building exercise 
designed to better manage defense forces, but rather as a series of short –term, stop-gap 
measures designed to forestall military takeovers.  
 Even in the absence of coups, there are always political dimensions to civil-
military relation worth studying.  The problem is that the civil-military story is often one 
about “the dog that didn’t bark.”  Since democratic consolidation has occurred, it is a 
story about relatively peaceful, cloistered relations within bureaucratic state institutions--
not conflict-ridden relations aired in public which threaten stability.  Few active duty 
officers speak up against official government policy anymore, since those who do are 
reprimanded or cashiered. Democratic governments have hired ministers of defense who 
can politically manage military affairs- not defense policy.  They know little about 
defense but quite a bit about  how to keep the military out of the limelight.  They smooth 
over the rough edges, put out small brush fires, calm jittery nerves, make pledges of 
support, reinterpret political messages in a positive light, all within the corridors of power 
rather than the public limelight.  They have succeeded at channeling and routinizing 
military pressures.  The military has a voice, but it is one heard inside defense and 
democratic institutions. Military officers can be seen in the defense ministries and in the 
congressional liaison offices.  They are there to press their case for greater funding, 
salaries and pensions, what limited acquisitions can be accommodated within constrained 
national budgets.  These appeals are part and parcel of normal democratic politics.  This 
is good news for civilian control, but not front page news.  It does not make for much 
political drama, and thus does not grab the attention of scholars. 
 The obsession with studying democracy persists in scholarly circles.  Most concur 
that civilian control of the military is an essential component to any definition of a 
consolidated democracy, but rarely delve beyond this. After giving lip service to 
definitions, scholars plunge into other topics of greater interest to them: political parties, 
electoral systems, presidentialist vs. parliamentary systems, executive-legislative 
relations, judicial reform and the rule of law, decentralization, and so many more. It is 
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unlikely this blind spot for defense issues will change any time soon so long as Latin 
American militaries stay in the barracks, away from the presidential palace, and do not 
threaten their neighbors. 
    
CONCLUSION  
 Defense policy has not been and is not a priority item, either among Latin 
American politicians or scholars of the region.  These states and their leaders do not face 
existential threats from foreign invasion, and the militarized disputes they do enter into 
are not serious enough to trigger genuine civilian interest in defense. Over the course of a 
century or more, militaries have turned inward to engage in politicized, internecine 
conflicts and conspiratorial plots against elected governments.  These moves prompt 
civilian attention to coup avoidance, not war avoidance.  Moreover, politicians have no 
incentive to become defense savvy in a region where defense establishments and their 
supporting industries provide few employment opportunities for constituents.  Scholars 
have no incentive to treat defense as a serious topic of inquiry in a region where there is a 
disconnect between civilian containment of politicized armies and civilian management 
of defense forces. 
 Should these conditions remain unaltered, it is unlikely civilian politicians will 
“discover” defense planning as a worthy policy goal any time soon.  And if that is true, 
then they will also fail to invest resources and personnel into the development of stronger 
institutions of civilian control.  As Thomas Bruneau has pointed out, getting the military 
to do what they are supposed to do within a democracy goes beyond mere subordination. 
Politicians must also concern themselves with military efficacy and efficiency. They must 
insure that militaries fulfill their internal and external roles and missions in a cost-
effective manner.31   This demands oversight, management, organization, and strategic 
planning--in short civilian expertise. It is essential, argues Bruneau, that defense-related, 
civilian-led institutions be fortified to embed that expertise so that the tri-fold goals of 
civilian control, efficacy and efficiency are achieved routinely and in perpetuity.32 The 
quandary however is that Latin American politicians are not and will not become 
motivated to achieve these ends because they do not make the connection between the 
political control of the military on the one hand and the pursuit of effective and efficient 
defense policy on the other hand.   Simply subordinating the military is important, but it 
is a low cost venture that can be pursued via strategies of  containment,  according to 
Trinkunas.33 These measures  weaken the military as a political actor,  but can do so with 
minimal resources, staff, and bureaucracy. Long term defense and security planning, 
however, cannot be “bought on the cheap.”    
 What might cause this situation to change?  New and troubling security threats 
would have to materialize. One scenario might revolve around the emerging ideological 
divide on the continent. This could conceivably leading neighboring states to perceive 
each other as threats and prepare accordingly.  The rise of radical left presidents in 
Venezuela and Bolivia could exacerbate age-old border disputes with the more 
conservative governments of Colombia and Chile, prompting greater attention to defense 
preparedness.  Another scenario that might unfold would have the United States fully 
recognize that Latin American states can perform subsidiary roles as international 
security providers and peacekeepers.  This has already taken place to some extent with 
the introduction of Salvadoran troops into Iraq, and the use of Brazilian, Argentinean and 
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Chilean troops as peacekeepers in Haiti.  To date however, these remain relatively small 
scale ventures which have not demanded large troop commitments from Latin America or 
resource commitments from the United States.   
 There is a third and final possibility.  It is one where the militaries of the region 
move from the rearguard to center stage in combating drug traffickers, transnational 
gangs and terrorists.  The justification for this kind of mission creep has been mounting in 
regional defense forums, where broader visions of the security threats and national 
security are gaining currency. Latin American defense ministers have begun to take up 
the view that if security is a multidimensional problem, it demands a multi-faceted 
response. That necessitates more fluid coordination between various security and non-
security-related agencies of state, and in turn, a relaxing of restrictions on the use of the 
military to permit that coordination to take place.  If it becomes easier to move the 
military to the front lines of these “wars” against new enemies of state,  then the concept 
of defense may shift as well.  If defense of the nation signifies a full scale military 
response to unconventional threats of the sort mentioned, then politicians and scholars 
alike may yet overcome their defense attention deficits. 34 
 
 




























Table 2. U.S. Civilian Employment in Government Defense Sector, FY 2005 
 
 






Army 217197 2676 219873 
Navy 174944 1651 176595 
Air Force 156508 2337 158845 
Other Defense Orgs.   83518 13734  97252 







Employment as % 
of EAP 
.445 
Source:  U.S. Department of Defense, Civilian Personnel Reports, 
http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/civilian/fy2006/december2005/december2005.htm 
 












Army 6160 525 6685 
Navy 7022 64 7086 
Air Force 11379 918 12297 
Jt. Staff 120 11 131 
Defense Ministry 999  999 










Source: Republica Argentina, Secretaria de Hacienda, Presupuesto para 
2005, Jurisdicción 45, Ministerio de Defensa, www.mecon.gov.ar 








Table 3. Private Sector Arms Production  Employment: Argentina and U.S., 2003 
 





Employment as % 
of EAP 
Argentina        5,000 15,264,783 .032 
U.S. 2,700,000 146,510,000 1.84 
U.S. private sector civilian defense employment, as a % of EAP,  is 57.5 times that of  
Argentina 
Source: SIPRI database, “Arms Forces, Weapons Holdings and Employment in Arms 
Production,” http://first.sipri.org/; EAP data from the International Labor Organization, 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 2004. 





Employment as a % 
of EAP 
Argentina 32,198 15,264,783 .21 
U.S. 3,352,565 146,510,000 2.28 
U.S. government and private sector  defense employment, as a % of EAP,  is eleven times 
that of Argentina 
Sources: See Tables above. 





EAP Employment as % 
of EAP 
How many times 
larger is the U.S. 
as arms employer?
USA 2,700,000 146,510,000 1.84  
Brazil 15,000 83,243,239 
(2001) 
.018 102 
Chile   5,000 6,357,620 (2004) .078 24 
Mexico   5,000 43,398,755 
(2004) 
.011 167 
Peru   3,000   3,747,307 
(2003) 
.08 23 
Source: SIPRI database, “Arms Forces, Weapons Holdings and Employment in Arms 
Production,” http://first.sipri.org/; EAP data from the International Labor Organization, 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 2003, p. 11-12; and ILO online, LABORSTA, 2004.  

















Military Size Mil Size as % 
of  Registered 
voters  
Argentina (2001)   24,735   70,100    .3 
Bolivia (2002)     4,155   31,500    .8 
Brazil (2002) 115,254 287,600    .2 
Chile (2001)     8,075   87,500  1.0 
Mexico (2000)   52,789 192,770 .  .4 
Nicaragua (1996)     2,421   17,000    .7 
Paraguay (1998)     2,049   20,200    .8 
Peru (2001)   14,906 100,000    .7 
Uruguay (1999)     2,402   25,600  1.1 
Venezuela (2000)   11,623   79,000    .7 
Total 238,409 911,270    .67 
Source: Voting data from  International  Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, http://www.idea.int/vt/; Military data from  
Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 2005/06 








Table 7. Military-Related Articles in Latin American Area Studies 
Journals, 
 as a Percent of Total Articles, 1976-2005 
 
 LARR LAPS/JISWA JLAS Averages
1976-85 6.0 8.4 13.5 9.3 
1986-95 2.7 13.2 7.3 7.7 
1996-05 2.3 8.8 4.9 5.3 
Data source: analysis of article titles of all research articles, 
research notes, commentary and debates  published for each  
volume of each journal during stated time periods.  Omits book 
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